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TAKINGS, NARRATIVES, AND POWER
Gregory S. Alexander*
"The Regulatory Takings Problem" is the title given to a story, or
narrative, that has become prominent in the literature on just compen-
sation issues.' The story is one of power and fear. It is about a per-
ceived imbalance of power between the two groups of actors involved
in the process of public land-use regulation-private landowners and
government regulators. It depicts scenarios of past or threatened
abuse of power by local land-use regulators, and it looks to the takings
clause generally and regulatory takings doctrine specifically as crucial
corrective devices, essential to set the power imbalance aright.
The dominant narrative describes local regulators as empowered,
possessing enormous leverage over private landowners, who are de-
picted as unempowered. The authority to regulate land use in a wide
variety of ways places local regulators in a position of potentially en-
joying virtual monopoly power over land-use entitlements 2 unless such
power is checked by constitutional strictures. Furthermore, this narra-
tive sees these local agencies as motivated to behave opportunistically,
abusing their discretion by strategically manipulating the situation of
the vulnerable landowners. Thus, chroniclers of this narrative argue,
courts must develop constitutional norms aimed at controlling the be-
havior of government land-use regulators because only regulators, not
landowners, are empowered.
There are narratives of power embedded in several opinions from
the Supreme Court's 1987 quartet of takings cases.3 These narratives,
stories about the power relationships between the parties involved in
the cases, constitute a second level of the opinions, operating just be-
low the abstract, impersonal doctrinal analysis. It is at this second
* Professor of Law, Cornell University. Thanks to Bill Fischel, Steve Shiffrin, Su-
san Williams and participants at the Dartmouth Regulatory Takings Conference for
comments on an earlier draft.
1. See, e.g., R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Do-
main (1985) [hereinafter R. Epstein, Takings]; Cunningham, Inverse Condemnation as a
Remedy for "Regulatory Takings," 8 Hastings Const. L.Q. 517 (1981); Epstein, Tak-
ings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1 (hereinafter Epstein, Descent and
Resurrection]; Kmiec, Regulatory Takings: The Supreme Court Runs Out of Gas in San
Diego, 57 Ind. LJ. 45 (1982); Krier, The Regulation Machine, 1 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1
(1982).
2. James Krier invokes the image of a "regulation machine, driven by an energy
source unavailable to private firms-call it the police power. Designed to promote the
public good, this machine [like private monopolies] is claimed to work private harm."
Krier, supra note 1, at I.
3. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); Hodel v.
Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. 107 S.
Ct. 1232 (1987). HeinOnline -- 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1752 1988
level, not the first, that one can gain deep insight into the Court's re-
cent takings decisions. Takings doctrine is generated not by any ab-
stract methodological or theoretical concern, but by the pictures that
judges have in their heads about the participants in the public land-use
planning arena, pictures about who is empowered, who is
unempowered and how those who enjoy a power monopoly have used
that power to their strategic advantage. Takings doctrine is shaped by
striking pictures and powerful metaphors that communicate basic as-
sumptions about who holds power and how those who hold power use
it. These pictures, or narratives, are shaped by underlying political vi-
sions, that is, belief structures about how society is and Qught to be
organized. While merely descriptive at the surface, these political vi-
sions, to borrow Richard Parker's words, "'figuratively communicate
ideological assumptions-general assumptions of political life-
through their characteristic rhetoric and their characteristic
metaphor.' "4
The 1987 takings decisions have intensified discussion about the
Court's methodology in takings law. In recent years the Court has re-
jected the use of any single comprehensive test to determine when gov-
ernment land-use regulations constitute takings. Justice Brennan's
widely discussed opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City 5 explicitly states that the Court would approach regulatory takings
questions on an ad hoc basis, balancing in each case several identified
factors. 6 Some commentators, including Frank Michelman and Mar-
garet Jane Radin,7 have detected a methodological shift in recent tak-
ings decisions, a reaction against open-ended balancing. Specifically,
they have pointed to the categorical reasoning of the Court in Loretto
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.8 and Keystone Bituminous Coal
Association v. DeBenedictis,9 and to the Court's conceptualistic approach
to defining constitutionally protectible property interests in Kaiser Aetna
v. United States 10 and Hodel v. Irving.II Radin suggests that the Court is
4. R. Parker, Political Vision in Constitutional Argument, Part I (1979) (unpub-
lished manuscript), quoted in H. Steiner, Moral Argument and Social Vision in the
Courts: A Study of Tort Accident Law 206 (1987). This Article's focus on narratives of
power is similar to other recent works that have unpacked the social visions embedded
in doctrinal argumentation. Henry Steiner's book examines the social visions underly-
ing modem tort law. Richard Parker's unpublished work focuses on constitutional argu-
mentation as a "cultural artifact . . .shaped by our vision of the present reality and
possible perfection of our political life." Id. at 205.
5. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
6. Id. at 123-24.
7. See Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1621-22 (1988); Radin, The
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 1667, 1681 (1988).
8. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
9. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
10. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
11. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
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constitutionalizing the classical liberal conception of property.1 2
Michelman interprets the new formalism as rule-of-law symbology gen-
erated in the aftermath of the death of property.1 3
This Article argues that if the Court has reinvigorated rule-of-law
values, it has done so in reaction to perceptions of the allocation of
power in the relevant social relationships. These perceptions in effect
constitute interpretations of events-interpretations whose meanings
derive from distinct political visions. Different political visions lead in-
terpreters of the same events to attach different, incompatible mean-
ings to these events.14 Examining the opposing narratives of power in
several of the 1987 cases enables us to perceive the contingent charac-
ter of what appear at the surface to be mere descriptions. The conflict-
ing descriptions of power expressed in the various opinions are not
statements of fact subject to empirical verification. Rather, they are
constructions of the social reality that takings doctrine is meant to ad-
dress. Recognizing that the descriptions are only narratives exposes
the contestability of every public conversation about basic visions of the
appropriate political ordering of our society.
Parts I and II of this Article reconstruct the narratives and counter-
narratives expressed in the opinions of the two major cases in the 1987
quartet, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles 1
and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,16 and identify the various
metaphors used to express political visions in the competing narratives
of these cases. Part III then connects the narratives and counter-narra-
tives with two opposing visions of government: republicanism and
public-choice theory. Finally, Part IV discusses the relationship be-
tween narrative and the Court's increased emphasis on formality in tak-
ings reasoning.
I. FIRST ENGLISH
A. Narrative: "Taking by Subterfuge"
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles 17 is a
slippery case, and Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion is a slip-
pery text. Narrowly construed, his opinion resolves only a remedial is-
sue, although one that has been the subject of intense speculation and
argument in recent years.' 8 Assuming that a taking exists, is judicial
12. Radin, supra note 7, at 1671-84.
13. Michelman, supra note 7, at 1625-29; accord Grey, The Disintegration of Prop-
erty, in Nomos XXII: Property 69 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds. 1980).
14. Cf. Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 251, 266-75 (1985)
(interpretations of factually straightforward O'Henry story depend heavily on reader's
starting point).
15. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
16. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
17. 107 S. Ct. 2378.
18. The principal catalysts for the remedy controversy are justice Brennan's dissent
1754 [Vol. 88:1752
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invalidation of the offending regulation the only remedy the aggrieved
landowner may get, or may landowners additionally recover "interim"
damages-that is, damages for the period between the regulation's en-
actment and its termination? Rehnquist's opinion, however, also
touches on the substantive question whether takings of time-limited
property interests are protected under the just compensation clause.1 9
This discussion suggests, as Justice Stevens pointedly remarks in his
dissenting opinion, that the Court has implicitly resolved not only the
remedial issue but also the substantive questions of what was taken and
when the taking occurred. 20 That Rehnquist's opinion touches upon
both the substantive and remedial issues is not surprising; a vision of
power underlies Rehnquist's opinion, and from the perspective of this
vision, the substantive and remedial issues cannot be isolated from each
other.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist tells the story of abuse of regulatory power
and manipulation of powerless landowners. The Lutheran church
wanted to rebuild its summer camp for handicapped children on land
that it owned in a Southern California canyon, but it was prevented
from doing so by Los Angeles County's flood control ordinance, which
prohibited construction in the canyon.2 1 As Rehnquist tells the story,
the particularly objectionable aspect of the county ordinance was its
durational indefiniteness. Although nominally an interim measure, it
lacked any fixed time limit. As a result the church was left in limbo,
powerless to rebuild or to use its land in any other feasible way for an
uncertain amount of time, conceivably forever.22
The picture that lies beneath the surface of the Chief Justice's
opinion is a "taking by subterfuge. '23 The picture that emerges from
his opinion is one of local planners scheming to take private property
without paying compensation by imposing substantial restrictions on
land use without limiting the duration of the restrictions. As the plan-
ners anticipated, if the restrictions went unchallenged or were sus-
tained after constitutional attack, they would become permanent,
depriving the owner of all use of its land. Even if the ordinance were
struck down, converting the restriction into a de facto temporary tak-
ing, judicial termination would occur only after repeated and lengthy
rounds of litigation, so that the county still would have gained the ad-
vantage of taking the church's land for an extended period of time with-
in San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) and Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
19. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2387-88.
20. Id. at 2391-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 2381-82.
22. Id. at 2388-89.
23. Michelman, supra note 7, at 1611-12. Michelman applies this characterization
to Justice Scalia's vision of'Nollan; I believe it is also-embedded in ChiefJustice Rehn-
quist's view of First English. ,
175519881
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out paying compensation. 24 Moreover, if the ruling of the California
Supreme Court in Agins v. City of Tiburon25 were followed, the only rem-
edy that the church could obtain would be judicial invalidation of the
ordinance and not damages. 26 Hence, regulators had incentives to be-
have strategically. They would respond to judicial invalidation of the
original ordinance by enacting a second, slightly milder version of the
same measure with the hope that it either would pass constitutional
muster or, better yet, would wear down the objecting owner into acqui-
escing in the restriction. 27 According to this scenario, the Agins rule is
the real source of the governmental abuse of power, for that rule elimi-
nates all incentive for regulators to behave responsibly toward private
landowners. It is, then, the Agins rule that Chief Justice Rehnquist goes
after in First English.28
The Agins rule itself implicates the substantive questions of
whether and when a taking has occurred. The rule that interim dam-
ages are not available rests on the premise that if there is a taking, it
occurs at the time of final judicial determination of the ordinance's in-
validity, not when the ordinance is initially adopted. The Court in First
English rejects that premise, redefining the "Mahon moment" 29-that is,
the time when regulators have crossed the elusive threshold to which
Justice Holmes alluded in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,30 transforming
regulation that can be undertaken with impunity into a compensable
taking of property.31 To see why the Court does so and how the vision
of power imbalance connects with its redefinition of the time when a
taking occurs requires some elaboration.
Imagine two different time lines. On the first time line, the regula-
tion is enacted at T-1. Moving to the right, a regulation is declared a
taking at T-2. T-3 represents an indefinite moment, occurring any time
after T-2 if the regulatory agency maintains its restriction. As Chief
Justice Rehnquist sees things, on the view taken by the California
Supreme Court in Agins, T-2, not T-1, is the time when the owner (0)
loses his entitlement, that is, the Mahon moment. It follows that the
24. See First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2384.
25. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other grounds,
447 U.S. 255 (1980).
26. Id. at 275-77, 598 P.2d at 29-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 376-78.
27. Professor Epstein has recently suggested that this rationale justifies extending
the First English ruling to other contexts of public land-use planning; that is, the pain of
paying interim damages is needed to deter regulatory strategic behavior. See Epstein,
Descent and Resurrection, supra note 1, at 30-31.
28. See First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2387.
29. The phrase is an oblique reference to J. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment
(1975). In respect to First English, it is also intended to underscore the temporal dimen-
sion of the problem there. Finally, 1987 was in a sense the final "moment" for the actual
decision in Mahon, which, it seems quite likely, the Court has now reversed in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
30. 260 ,U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
31. Firsi English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388.
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period between T-2 and T-3 is the time frame during which 0 has been
deprived of property and for which he is constitutionally entitled to
monetary compensation in exchange for the agency maintaining its reg-
ulation. More to the point, under the Agins interpretation, 0 was not
deprived of any entitlement during the time period between T-1 and T-
2. Consequently, there is no basis for awarding interim damages be-
cause 0 suffered no constitutional injury during this time.
A very different time line emerges from Rehnquist's analysis of the
timing of entitlement deprivation. Using the same three points in time,
T-1, when the regulation is first enacted-not T-2, when it is first de-
clared to be a taking-is the time when O's property is initially taken.
T- 1 is the Mahon moment, when a regulatory taking first occurs, even
though judicial determination of the Mahon moment follows it by some
period of time (which in the case of First English was almost nine years, a
point that one strongly suspects particularly bothers the majority). It
follows, according to this analysis, that even if the county terminates
the restriction immediately after the judicial determination that a regu-
latory taking has occurred, 0 still must receive damages for the depriva-
tion of her entitlement during the period between T-1 and T-2.
Judicial termination of the regulation alone is an inadequate constitu-
tional remedy for it does nothing to respond to what happened to O's
constitutional property before the judicial declaration. In other words,
for the same reason that 0 is entitled to receive damages between T-2
and T-3, 0 is entitled to monetary compensation between T-1 and T-2.
From the perspective of protecting O's constitutional property, the two
time frames are indistinguishable. This is why Chief Justice Rehnquist
states that the Agins holding, while not repudiating the "general rule"
that "if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking,"'3 2 nev-
ertheless "truncated the rule by disallowing damages that occurred
prior to the ultimate invalidation of the challenged regulation,"33 for it
is also established doctrine, he notes, that "in the event of a taking, the
compensation remedy is required by the Constitution.1
3 4
One way of thinking about Rehnquist's analysis of the remedy is-
sues in First English is in terms of retroactivity.35 The right to recover
interim damages is a kind of transitional rule. Damages are both justi-
fied and necessary because the injunction remedy lags behind the criti-
cal event, the taking of property. This is the gist of the Court's
statement that if a regulation is later held to be a taking, the owner is
entitled to back compensation because the regulation was equivalent to
a temporary physical appropriation.
32. Id. at 2386.
33. Id. at 2387.
34. Id. at 2386.
35. See Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Ret-
roactivity, 1987 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 379, 430-32 (discussing the retroactive applica-
tion of the takings clause).
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The analogy to temporary physical appropriations in First English
connects for the first time two principles that previously existed sepa-
rately in Supreme Court takings jurisprudence. The first principle is
the Mahon principle itself-that is, governmental actions that nominally
only regulate land use may go so far as to become takings of property.
This principle in a sense represents a rejection of nominalism, a rejec-
tion that is necessary for the takings clause to do the job that Holmes
and others have presumed it was intended to do-namely, create a con-
stitutional bulwark against excessive collective action,3 6 or more di-
rectly, impede excessively redistributive legislative schemes.3 7
The second principle predating First English is that a dispossessed
owner is constitutionally entitled to damages when the government has
physically appropriated her land even if the appropriation is only tem-
porary.38 It has long been understood that a total taking occurs when a
regulation deprives an owner of a "definite element"3 9 of the land
package, such as a servitude or a leasehold estate. That the regulation
does not prevent 0 from possessing or using the land forever is not
controlling since many discrete, legally recognized property interests
do not entitle the owner to possess or use indefinitely; yet, when the
entirety of such an interest has been taken from an owner, she is enti-
tled to be compensated for its loss. Judicial abrogation of the regula-
tion after the interest's time limit has passed does absolutely nothing to
compensate the ousted owner.
Combining these two principles, the Court treats the Los Angeles
County ordinance prohibiting Mill Creek Canyon owners from con-
structing on their land as a physical appropriation of an estate even
though there was no ouster of the sort that had existed in United States v.
36. On the intellectual roots of thejust compensation clause, see Note, The Origins
and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94
Yale LJ. 694 (1985) (arguing that the emergence of a just compensation requirement,
first in post-revolutionary state constitutions and later in the fifth amendment of the
federal Constitution, represented the general shift from republican political ideology to
liberal ideology).
37. For Holmes's attitude toward legislative redistribution of property rights, see 2
Holmes-Pollock Letters 108 (M. Howe ed. 1961). Referring to his recent opinion in
Mahon, Holmes wrote to Pollock:
My ground is that the public only got on to this land by paying for it and that if
they saw fit to pay only for a surface right they can't enlarge it because they
need it now any more than they could have taken the right of being there in the
first place.
Id. at 109 (letter of Dec. 31, 1922). On Mahon as an antiredistributive decision, see
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev.
561, 581-87 (1984).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 22 (1958) (government takes phys-
ical possession of right-of-way easement across privately owned land for a pipeline);
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 16 (1949) (government takes physical
possession of the facilities of a laundry company).
39. The term comes from Jacob, The Law of Definite Elements: Land in Excep-
tional Packages, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1369, 1372-86 (1982).
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Dow or the other decisions protecting ownership fragments.40 Judicial
invalidation only affects the duration of the estate that the government
has taken. Just compensation for the total loss of the time-share estate
requires the award of money damages:
To gain perspective on the critical leap in the Court's reasoning,
one must sketch a brief typology of governmental actions that affect a
private landowner's use of her land. This kind of categorizing of cases
is very much a part of Chief Justice Rehnquist's reasoning. In type 1
cases, the government through formal condemnation takes permanent
title to land. This is the classic forced sale to the government that the
eminent domain power permits. The ousted owner receives money
compensation equal to the value of the fee estate taken. In type 2 cases,
the government, acting again under its eminent domain power, takes
physical possession of land for a limited period of time. The only dif-
ference between type 2 cases and type 1 cases is the durational nature
of the appropriated estate. Physical ouster occurs in both, and the
owner receives monetary compensation for the lost value of a time-lim-
ited estate such as a leasehold. In type 3 cases, the government does
not itself formally take possession of the land for any period of time or
oust the private owner, but it imposes restrictions on the owner's use of
indefinite length and of such magnitude that the owner's ability to use
or enjoy the parcel is practically nil so long as the restrictions remain in
effect. During that time, her estate is reduced to bare title. This is a
regulatory taking. It is problematic because unlike.the exercise of emi-
nent domain, there is an interval during which there is uncertainty
whether a taking has occurred and during which the owner has lost the
use of her property without compensation for that loss. First English
falls into this third category.4 1
The question, which the Court answers affirmatively, is whether
type 3 cases should be assimilated into the type 2 category. The effect
of doing so is to conclude that just as the taking occurs when govern-
ment first acts in category 2, so in category 3 the taking occurs when the
regulation is first adopted. Similarly, with respect to the compensation
issue, just as the Dow line of cases concluded that no distinction should
be drawn between categories 1 and 2 because in both instances, estates,
albeit of different durational character, are taken, so the Court should
not distinguish category 3 cases from category 2 cases when judicial
determination turns the regulation into a temporary taking.42
Assimilating these last two categories of governmental action rep-
40. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 38.
41. At least it does so on the Court's construction of the facts. The ordinance did
not literally preclude the church from occupying its land. The prohibition on construc-
tion and reconstruction of flood-destroyed buildings, however, effectively did end the
church's use of the land as a retreat center for handicapped children.
42. Justice Stevens's opinion in First English makes it clear that he was unwilling to
assimilate type 2 and type 3 cases. See 107 S. Ct. at 2393 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
1988] 1-759
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resents an extension of Mahon's antinomalist premise that government
cannot escape its obligation to pay for what it has taken simply by using
the form of a highly restrictive regulation. The question, however, that
Rehnquist's opinion never addresses, let alone explicates, is why it is
appropriate to extend the scope of the Mahon premise in this way, lo-
cating the Mahon moment at the time when the ordinance is first
enacted.43
It is tempting, especially in light of the analogy to takings of lease-
hold estates, to say that Rehnquist's definition of the Mahon moment
rests on sheer conceptualism, specifically on an essentialist conception
of property. This interpretation becomes even more tempting when
one places First English in juxtaposition withJustice O'Connor's opinion
for the Court in Hodel v. Irving.44 Her reference in Hodel to the "right
to pass on property," like the right to exclude, as one of" 'the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized
as property' "45 reflects the same sort of essentialist approach to prop-
erty definition that Richard Epstein develops in his book Takings.46
Although Rehnquist's First English opinion does make noises about
entitlement splitting,47 it is inadequate simply to attribute First English
to an essentialist theory of property. One reason for caution in empha-
sizing conceptions of property as central to the Court's recent takings
43. Richard Epstein has expressed the same view concerning the timing of the tak-
ing. Arguing that awarding interim damages does not bind the legislature to exercise its
power of eminent domain, Epstein observes that the county has the option of not enact-
ing the regulation in the first place. "The taking therefore occurs not at the time of the
final judicial determination, but at the earlier moment when the regulation was first
placed into effect." Epstein, Descent and Resurrection, supra note 1, at 28.
44. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
45. Id. at 2083 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
46. R. Epstein, Takings, supra note 1. Epstein revealed his unitary, aggregated
conception of property several years ago when he attacked Bruce Ackerman for charac-
terizing the ordinary person's conception of property as "irreducible crudity." See
Epstein, The Next Generation of Legal Scholarship? (Book Review), 30 Stan. L. Rev.
635, 644-45 (1978) (citing B. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 114-15
(1977)). To Epstein "common sense," rather than "science," provides a clear definition
of the taking of property: "[a]ny diminution of rights in the bundle of any holder, no
matter what becomes of those rights." Id. at 640. Such a definition would increase
drastically the effect of the takings clause on an enormous variety of government regula-
tions, which is precisely the normative point lurking behind Epstein's conceptual analy-
sis. Epstein here, and even more elaborately in his book, in effect takes Charles
Donahue's historical-descriptive claim about the "agglomerative tendency" in Anglo-
American property law, see Donahue, The Future of the Concept of Property Predicted
from Its Past, in Nomos XXII: Property, supra note 13, at 28, and transforms it into a
conceptual-normative claim.
47. See First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388-89. Rehnquist has exhibited an attraction
to entitlement splitting in several previous cases. See PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980) (dictum); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
176, 179-80 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 149 n.13
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally Note, Justice Rehnquist's Theory of
Property, 93 Yale LJ. 541 (1984).
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decisions is that the Court has sent very mixed messages about its
whole conceptualization of property. Although Hodel has strong over-
tones of property essentialism, 48 it was only nine years ago that the
Court in Andrus v. Allard seemingly rejected such an essentialist defini-
tion of property.49 More importantly, Justice Stevens's majority opin-
ion in Keystone reaffirms Penn Central's rejection of entitlement splitting.
".'."Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular seg-
ment have been entirely abrogated.' "50
This excerpt echoes the approach to the takings question that
Bruce Ackerman has described as "Scientific Policymaking," an ap-
proach that rejects the outlook of the "Ordinary Observer": "for the
legal Scientist, the cardinal sin is to discriminate among property-bun-
dles and declare that some contain the essential rights of property while
others do not."51 "The real question for the law," he says, "is not to
identify . . . 'the' property owner through some mysterious intuitive
process but to determine in whose bundle one or another right may
best be put."'5 2
Chief Justice Rehnquist comes perilously close to committing the
Scientist's "cardinal sin" in parts of First English.53 From these
passages, one could theorize that the Court has oscillated between the
perspectives of the "Ordinary Observer" and the "Scientific Poli-
cymaker."'54 Focusing on the style or mode of reasoning, however,
48. See Hodel, 107 S. Ct. at 2083-84.
49. 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979). Justice Brennan, who writes the majority opinion in
Andrus v. Allard, joins ChiefJustice Rehnquist's opinion in First English.
50. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1248 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130).
51. B. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 116 (1977).
52. Id. at 27.
53. See 107 S. Ct. at 2388-89.
54. This distinction between Scientific Policymaker and Ordinary Observer as well
as Ackerman's necessitarian argument for the former is critiqued in Alexander, The
Concept of Property in Private and Constitutional Law: The Ideology of the Scientific
Turn in Legal Analysis, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1545 (1982). In an interesting variation on
Ackerman's distinction, Professor Terry Fisher convincingly argues that public percep-
tions are central not only to Ackerman's Ordinary Observer, buit also that the normative
theories, which are the foundations of the two dominant versions of Scientific Poli-
cymaking, Kantianism and Utilitarianism, themselves require that "popular conceptions
of the legitimate scope of governmental regulations of private property" be taken into
account. Fisher, The Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 1774, 1776 & n.12 (1988). The more significant point of which Fisher
reminds us is that the causal relationship between legal doctrine and individual percep-
tions and preferences runs in both directions simultaneously: doctrine shapes as well as
responds to ordinary perceptions. Id. at 1780-81. The point creates complications for
both Ordinary Observing and Scientific Policymaking that result from the role ofjudicial
doctrine in shaping the very perceptions that, according to these theories, are supposed
to determine legal doctrine. Not only does this phenomenon of adaptive preferences
complicate the utilitarian calculus of formalists, like Professor Rose-Ackerman, who re-
ject "ad-hocery" because of its adverse consequences on economic behavior, see Rose-
Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1697
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misses the mark because it overlooks the Court's perceptions of the
power stakes in the cases. First English's definition of the Mahon mo-
ment grows out of a distinct political vision evident in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's narrative.
In a revealing part of his opinion, the ChiefJustice first provides us
with our normative bearings, reminding us that the just compensation
requirement is "'designed to bar Government fromforcing some peo-
ple alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should
be born by the public as a whole.' -55 He then pointedly refers to the
fact that although the Lutheran church had filed suit within one month
after the "interim" ordinance went into effect, more than eight years
later it was still in limbo, all use of its land effectively blocked without
having had the merits of its complaint heard.56 The Court is palpably
bothered by the church having been paralyzed indefinitely. Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's message is that the church has been grossly jerked
around. The government has flagrantly abused its monopoly power
over an unprotected landowner. Judicial termination of the ordinance
is, under these circumstances, hardly the kind of protection that will
even up the match. As Rehnquist states, "[i]nvalidation of the ordi-
nance.., after this period of time... is not a sufficient remedy to meet
the demands of the Just Compensation Clause." 57 The Court wants to
put a more robust remedy in the private landowner's hands, one with
the kind of bite that would deter public planners from manipulating
private owners. 58 In other words, the Court, by defining the picture of
(1988), but it also complicates decisional strategies (which, I take it, include Ordinary
Observing and at least some versions of Kantian Policymaking alike) that start with the
premise that judicial action derives legitimacy from its role in neutrally enabling individ-
uals to'realize self-defined preferences. The posture of neutrality is simply chimerical.
What Fisher leaves unexplored is the implication of his point regarding the "prefer-
ence-shaping power of the judiciary," Fisher, supra, at 1790, for the methodological
and, behind that, ideological debates. My sense is that Fisher's point reinforces my ar-
gument for a fluid takings methodology. See infra text accompanying notes 112-15.
Combining Fisher's point with my point about the interpretive and ideological character
of descriptions of power relations, public perceptions of what justice requires by way of
the state's compensatory responsibilities to affected property owners rest to a significant
extent on (contingent) interpretations of empowerment, which in turn imply distinctive
normative visions of government. Preventing one interpretation or vision from acquir-
ing a privileged status is less important at the popular level than it is at the level of legal
discourse. In my view, it is especially in the area of takings law, because of its acutely
political character, that pace Professor Rose-Ackerman, see Rose-Ackerman, supra, it is
most important to maintain fluidity.
55. 107 S. Ct. at 2388 (emphasis added) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Consider this scenario, which alternatively could be titled "Against All Odds"
or "Annie Get Your Gun," described elsewhere by Professor Kmiec:
[I]nvalidation results only after protracted litigation in which a landowner,
against incredible odds, proves that his property has been rendered worthless
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a one-sided allocation of power between regulators and owner, creates
the impression that only a damages remedy could alter this structural
imbalance and prevent coercion.
B. Counter-Narrative: Regulation and Deliberation
A strikingly different view of the power relationships between pri-
vate owner and government land-use regulators emerges from Justice
Stevens's dissenting opinion. The picture that emerges from his narra-
tive is one of regulators acting in good faith. In his account, the county
ordinance is a straightforward safety measure, precipitated by the his-
tory of flooding in Mill Creek Canyon.59 In circumstances such as
these, government necessarily must act, imposing limits on private de-
velopment when development creates harmful externalities and private
agreement cannot resolve the problem. This kind of governmental ac-
tion, remedying a market failure, cannot be a taking.
Stevens's vision of good-faith regulatory behavior is tied to an un-
derstanding of delay as the consequence of the deliberative character of
politics. This connection is suggested by his analogy to the situation of
a developer who sometimes must endure protracted delay as a zoning
board and then courts hear his request before it is finally resolved.60
Indefinite delay alone, Stevens says, does not justify an inference of
abuse of power. Government delay is simply a fact of life in a regula-
tory state; it is the price that landowners must pay for deliberation and
public conversation concerning land use. Thus he states, "I am con-
vinced that the public interest in having important governmental deci-
sions made in an orderly, fully informed way amply justifies the
temporary burden on the citizen that is the inevitable by-product of
democratic government." 61
Similarly with respect to the church's position, Stevens provides a
very different vision of empowerment. The history of flooding in Mill
Creek Canyon makes him doubt that the church would have rebuilt
even in the absence of the county's restriction, so that there is an ele-
ment of disingenuousness to its claim.62 Moreover, Stevens thinks that
the church's remaining in limbo for an extended period of time was a
by regulation. However, invalidation does not mean that the landowner can
proceed to develop his land. In fact, it often means just the opposite, since the
landowner then faces a hostile local government, which not only has an arsenal
of other controls with which to stymie the landowner, but atso may have
enough malevolent creativity to enact a regulation only slightly less restrictive
than the one invalidated to start the litigation game all over again.
Kmiec, supra note 1, at 51 (citations omitted).
59. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2391-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 2396.
61. Id. at 2399.
62. Thus Stevens states, "In light of the tragic flood and the loss of life that precipi-
tated the safety regulations here, it is hard to understand how [the Church] ever ex-
pected to rebuild on Lutherglen." Id. at 2392.
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problem of its own making insofar as it had never sought ajudicial dec-
laration that the ordinance was invalid, requesting monetary compensa-
tion instead. 63 Perhaps the situation would not have been much
different if the church had exhausted the appropriate state remedies as
Stevens suggests,6 4 but the point is that in the picture he describes, the
power alignment is a lot more balanced than the Rehnquist narrative
suggests.
What we are left with from the rhetoric of the opinions in First Eng-
lish are two strikingly different attitudes toward government regulators.
One is suspicious and skeptical; the other is optimistic and sympathetic.
II. NOLIAN
A. Narrative: Regulatory Extortion
First English has been discussed at such length because it may be
the most controversial of the 1987 quartet and the one potentially hav-
ing the most dramatic implications. 65 Yet Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission 66 tells much the same story as First English. Both are based,
at bottom, on tellings of the story of regulatory power and coercion.
Justice Scalia's opinion tells a story of regulatory extortion and
strategic behavior. He adopts a vivid metaphor, first used by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court several years ago, describing a local gov-
ernment's exaction scheme as nothing more than "'an out-and-out
plan of extortion.' "67 The regulatory extortion in Nollan took the form
of a conditional land-use permit for which the condition lacked, in the
Court's judgment, a sufficient nexus with the ostensible state land-use
objective.68 Scalia's nexus scrutiny is a response to his perception of
regulatory manipulation and virtual deceit. The access rationale, while
itself a legitimate purpose, on the facts of this case was just a ruse, a
trick by which the Coastal Commission could achieve an objective that
it could not obtain directly without paying compensation-namely, ob-
taining a lateral public easement across the Nollan beachfront lot.69
63. Id. at 2397.
64. Id. at 2396-98.
65. The full effect of First English's interim damages remedy can be appreciated if
one imagines its application to zoning cases in which developers successfully challenge a
zoning restriction that remains in effect throughout the period of litigation. This is ex-
actly the dream that First English has generated for those on the right who celebrate
"privatization." See, e.g., Epstein, Descent and Resurrection, supra note 1, at 31.
66. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
67. Id. at 3148 (quotingJ.E.D. Assocs. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d
12, 14-15 (1981)).
68. Id. at 3149-50.
69. Another metaphor that applies to Nollan, one that Frank Michelman introduces,
is "taking by subterfuge." See Michelman, supra note 7, at 1612. Michelman imagines a
scenario in which California legislators, whose actual objective is to impose a public
easement laterally across the privately owned beachfront, try to avoid the Loretto categor-
ical rule that even trivial permanent physical occupations are per se takings by condi-
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You cannot get something for nothing, Justice Scalia says, and height-
ened judicial scrutiny of a regulation's instrumental efficacy is both ap-
propriate and necessary whenever it appears that regulators have
attempted indirectly to do just that.
Like Rehnquist's First English opinion, Scalia's opinion portrays a
grossly imbalanced power relationship between private owners and
public regulators. Planning regulators are able to extort goods from
private landowners because the agencies possess the same sort of bar-
gaining superiority over regulated owners that loan sharks hold over
their hapless victims. Owners accede to regulations, exactions or re-
strictions because they have no choice but to do so; they are simply
powerless.70
To dramatize this view of regulation as extortion, Justice Scalia
tells a parable that plays on Holmes's image of the person shouting fire
in a crowded theatre.71 Imagine, Scalia invites us, a state regulation
that forbids patrons to shout fire in a crowded theatre but simulta-
neously grants dispensations from the prohibition to persons who are
willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury.72 This story sets a
benchmark for identifying governmental strategic behavior. Its
message is that the state is attempting to conceal its coercion in the
guise of the principle that the greater power includes the lesser. Under
its police power, the state clearly could enact a ban simpliciter on
shouting fire in a crowded theatre. Normally this greater power would
include the power to enact measures less restrictive of free speech
rights such as a conditional ban, but not, as here, when the specific
condition appropriates property in a way totally unrelated to the objec-
tive that justifies the total ban. Under these circumstances, there is no
paradox in concluding that the greater does not include the lesser, for
to follow that principle blindly would enable the state to succeed in its
coercive design and encourage similar strategic behavior by other offi-
cials. At the conclusion of this parable Scalia states his message in no
uncertain terms: "In short, unless the permit condition serves the same
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction
tioning access to public utility services on the owner's agreeing to dedicate an easement
of way to the public. Id. at 1611-12. Here we see abuse of power taking the form of
sneaky, devious local regulators cooking up some scheme by which a defenseless
owner's property is taken without compensation. Only it turns out that the regulators
are not so devious after all because their real motive, to take without compensating, is
transparent.
70. The same scenario of power imbalance appears in the recent and growing liter-
ature on land-use exactions. For example, referring to exactions recently imposed on
San Francisco hotel developers, Professor Fischel states, "[that some hotel developers
willingly pay these exactions suggests the power of the municipality's position." Fischel,
The Economics of Land Use Exactions: A Property Rights Analysis, Law & Contemp.
Probs., Winter 1987, at 101, 111.
71. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
72. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
19881 1765
HeinOnline -- 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1765 1988
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
is not a valid regulation of land use but 'an out-and-out plan of
extortion.' ,,73
What does this mean for the practice of municipal exactions? Does
it threaten those practices across the board?74 Or is it limited to those
exactions that are "Loretto-like" physical invasions, as Frank Michelman
suggests?75 Without answering these questions, it appears that fears of
Nollan's implications for municipal exactions have some basis. The
pre-Nollan focus on impact made it very unlikely that exactions would
fall under the Mahon premise.76 It is likely thatJustice Scalia introduces
the strict-scrutiny test precisely to overcome this weakness in the pre-
existing analytic by which the validity of municipal exactions would be
evaluated. Without some constitutional filter, Scalia may fear, regula-
tory inflation may occur as local governments strategically enact more
and more planning restrictions, solely to extract benefits in exchange
for their removal.
Applied to municipal exactions, the nexus requirement is similar to
the private-law requirement that in order for covenants to run with the
land or to be enforceable in equity against successors, they must "touch
and concern" benefitted or burdened land.77 That requirement has
been notably problematic in connection with the analogous practice of
developers' requiring subdivision exactions from purchasers in the
form of covenants to pay fees for maintenance of common areas in the
development. Since Neponsit Property Owners'Association v. Emigrant Indus-
trial Savings Bank,78 the trend has been that a covenant to pay money
touches and concerns (that is, satisfies a nexus requirement to a legiti-
mate land-use planning objective), even though the money is to be used
for "public purposes" upon land other than the obligor's own parcel,
when it is used to maintain areas that the obligor uses in common with
other owners, including all subdivision common facilities. 79 Similarly,
73. Id. (quotingJ.E.D. Assocs. v. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15
(1981)).
74. See Fischel, Property Rights and the Takings Clause, in Significant Business
Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1986-1987 Term 47, 52-54 (1988).
75. See Michelman, supra note 7, at 1613-14.
76. See, e.g., Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 578 (1985) (sustaining a conditional permit virtually identical to that in Nollan
under the weaker "reasonable relationship" standard); Home Builders Ass'n v. City of
Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1977) (sustaining mandatory dedication of land for
park use under "reasonably attributable" standard); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale,
18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966) (sustaining monetary exactions
used to buy land for park use under "reasonableness" standard); Babcock, Foreword,
Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1987, at 1, 3.
77. See, e.g., C. Berger, Land Ownership and Use 566 (3d ed. 1983).
78. 278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938).
79. See, e.g., Kell v. Bella Vista Village Property Owners Ass'n, 258 Ark. 757, 528
S.W.2d 651 (1975); Rodruck v. Sand Point Maintenance Comm'n, 48 Wash. 2d 565, 295
P.2d 714 (1956).
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exactions of on-site improvements ° and perhaps some off-site im-
provements8 ' might satisfy the takings nexus requirement. Yet what
about cash exactions, especially those in which the money is to be used
for nonspecific purposes of "neighborhood development," as in the
case of a Chicago program?8 2 Exactions of this sort look more like the
hypothetical that Justice Scalia says would not pass constitutional mus-
ter.8 3 He must have anticipated that introducing the nexus require-
ment would invite other property owners to challenge a variety of
regulatory conditions, and it is easy to imagine that he was specifically
aware of local government exactions, given the controversy surround-
ing that practice. One can only speculate, but it should not surprise
anyone if in the future Justice Scalia characterizes programs like cash
exactions for neighborhood improvement as, to borrow Professor Ep-
stein's language, "an extortionate tax."8 4
Ultimately, the narrative of public regulatory power undergirds
Justice Scalia's nexus requirement. It is a reaction to the response that
regulators are abusing their power by trying to get something for noth-
ing. Scalia's strict-scrutiny approach echoes Holmes's fear of "the petty
larceny of the police power."'8 5
B. Counter-Narrative: Private Manipulation of Power
Justice Brennan's narrative stands Justice Scalia's on its head.
Brennan is explicit about whom, as between the Commission and the
private owners, he sees as the manipulators. He states, "it is private
landowners who are the interlopers,"8 6 and "[i]t is ... private landown-
ers who threaten the disruption of settled public expectations."'8 7 He
emphasizes that the conditional permit "is not unilateral government
action."8 8 The government's posture was merely reactive, benignly at-
tempting to maintain a "'reciprocity of advantage'- 89 in response to
the Nollans' plan to intensify development.
Brennan's perception that the Nollans, not the Coastal Commis-
sion, are the interlopers rests on his understanding of the character of
land located within the coastal zone under California law. He states:
California ... has clearly established that the power of exclu-
sion for which appellants seek compensation simply is not a
strand in the bundle of appellants' property rights, and appel-
80. See, e.g., Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (1952).
81. See, e.g., Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 117 N.H. 817, 379
A.2d 200 (1977).
82. See Chicago Tribune, Aug. 26, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 8.
83. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3148 (1987).
84. Epstein, Descent and Resurrection, supra note 1, at 37.
85. 1 Holmes-Laski Letters 457 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
86. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3153 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 3154.
88. Id. at 3158.
89. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
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lants have never acted as if it were. Given this state of affairs,
appellants cannot claim that the deed restriction has deprived
them of a reasonable expectation to exclude from their prop-
erty persons desiring to gain access to the sea.90
In his view, local law and social practices have impressed a public char-
acter on coastal-zone land, an arrangement very much like a public
trust.91 That perception leads him to recognize a much wider scope of
discretion for the Commission to regulate all forms of access within the
coastal zone. The quasi-public character of all coastal land undermines
any sharp distinction between lateral and littoral access within the zone.
Justice Brennan's opinion, moreover, reflects a generally deferen-
tial attitude toward the Commission. 92 We hear repeatedly about the
Commission's expertise, its attempt to make a reasonable adjustment of
the competing interests in using coastal property and the particular
need to maintain flexibility for government planning agencies when
land-use demand is as intense as it is in coastal areas.93 This is plainly
not the same story that Justice Scalia tells, nor is it the same story that
ChiefJustice Rehnquist tells in First English. More fundamentally, it re-
flects a strikingly different attitude toward the role of regulators.
III. NARRATIVES OF POWER AND VISIONS OF GOVERNMENT
The narrative of regulatory power, repeated in the majority opin-
ions in First English and Nollan, in one sense transcends conventional
labels of liberal or conservative. Both Justice Brennan and Professor
Richard Epstein, for example, have been among its most forceful
chroniclers.
Justice Brennan's widely noted dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas
&. Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,94 which laid the groundwork for First
English, relies explicitly and heavily on the story of regulatory power
and owner powerlessness. 95 His comparison in that case between gov-
90. Id. at 3159.
91. Id. at 3152-54; see also Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Com-
merce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 727-30 (1986) (discuss-
ing historical origins and modem implications of public trusts in tidelands and
waterways). One significant practical implication of Nollan may be the rejection of the
"inherently public property" theory as a rationale for the exercise of broad public regu-
latory power over land use, although Justice Blackmun, perhaps more wishfully than
assuredly, denies this implication. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3162 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
92. Deference to regulatory decision makers is also evident in Brennan's majority
opinion in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).
93. E.g., Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3151-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
94. 450 U.S. 621, 636 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. Joan Williams' interesting discussion of Brennan's opinion in San Diego Gas &
Electric alludes to the story of power allocation. See Williams, The Constitutional Vul-
nerability of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law,
1986 Wis. L. Rev. 83, 121-37.
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emnment land-use planners and police 96 suggests a perception of plan-
ners as possessing monopoly power over those whom they regulate. As
Joan Williams observes, "Brennan has emerged as the Burger Court's
chief defender of property owners chafing under stringent economic
regulations. '97
Brennan's narratives in San Diego Gas & Electric and Nollan do not,
however, contradict each other. Rather they are variations on a single
theme. It is abuse of power that counts, but abuse of power can go
both ways. In Brennan's view, unlike Scalia's and Rehnquist's, private
landowners are not invariably powerless and vulnerable to regulatory
coercion. Nevertheless, government regulators sometimes do exceed
the scope of their authority, and when they do, private landowners
must have available to them a remedy with some bite in order to re-
dress the balance of power. 98
Richard Epstein's recent book Takings99 presents a pure, undiluted
version of the story of regulatory coercion. His story is one of, iii Frank
Michelman's words, "politics unbounded."10 o Thus, Epstein writes:
The state can now rise above the rights of the persons whom it
represents; it is allowed to assert novel rights that it cannot
derive from the persons whom it benefits. Private property
once may have been conceived as a barrier to government
power, but today that barrier is easily overcome, almost for the
asking.' 0 '
As this passage makes clear, Epstein's vision of excessive regulatory
power is far broader than Justice Brennan's and is motivated by differ-
ent concerns.10 2 Using the just compensation clause as his sole
96. "[I]f a policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a planner?" San
Diego Gas & Electric, 450 U.S. at 661 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Williams, supra note 95, at 136.
98. See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3162 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. R. Epstein, Takings, supra note 1.
100. Michelman, supra note 7, at 1626 n.130.
101. R. Epstein, Takings, supra note 1, at x.
102. Brennan's concern with preserving the damages remedy for other constitu-
tional violations seemingly motivates his use of the remedy for regulatory takings. See
Williams, supra note 95, at 120-37, 149-50. Brennan apparently believes that there is
no basis for distinguishing between constitutional property claims and constitutional
nonproperty rights, rather than, as in Epstein's case, having a fundamental aversion to
legislative activism. (It is impossible to believe, for example, that Brennan shares Ep-
stein's desire to dismantle the New Deal regulatory program or government entitlement
programs.)
There is a large irony in this linkage of property rights and civil rights. See Lynch v.
Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (Stewart, J.,joined by Brennan, Doug-
las and Marshall,JJ.) ("[T]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights
is a false one.... The right to enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than
the right to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a 'personal' right ...."). During much
of the 1950s and 60s there existed both a perceived conflict between property rights and
civil rights, with the political right using property rights to stave off the growth of civil
rights, and a redefinition of property from the left to secure a broader range of constitu-
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weapon, Epstein attacks regulatory institutions that Brennan would
never dream of dismantling, including workers' compensation laws,
progressive taxation and wealth transfer programs.10 3 At least with re-
spect to the public regulation of land use, however, both Brennan and
Epstein have internalized the story of power imbalance.
Although the narrative of regulatory power is not told exclusively
by persons on the political right, the left and the right tend to tell dif-
ferent stories. The exchange several years ago between Robert Ellick-
son and Gerald Frug about the status of cities indicates how differently
the two ends of the political spectrum perceive the present allocation of
power in society.10 4 Frug's vision is one of city powerlessness, whereas
Ellickson's account emphasizes the legal advantages that cities cur-
rently enjoy over private governance arrangements such as homeown-
ers' associations. Justice Brennan aside, individuals on the right are far
more likely to tell the story of power imbalance and abuse of regulatory
power, at least in an overtly political version.
The tendency of individuals at different ends of the political spec-
trum to tell different stories about power suggests the possibility of
connecting the narratives and counter-narratives with opposing theo-
ries of government. In recent years, legal and political theorists have
distinguished two theories of government: republicanism10 5 and public
choice. Broadly described, republicans are committed normatively to
the ideal of the common good.'0 6 Their commitment to governance in
furtherance of the common good, which requires subordination of pri-
tional protection for government-provided benefits. In the late 1970s and 80s, with ju-
dicial protection of civil rights widely taken for granted, the right reversed its strategy,
arguing that property rights cannot be distinguished from civil rights. The argument is
strategic in that it aims at securing the same activist protection for property rights that
was extended to civil rights during the height of the civil rights movement. Brennan's
position on takings remedies is similarly strategic, but with the reverse objective-recog-
nizing broad constitutional remedies for property rights to secure broad remedies for
violations of nonproperty individual rights. The defects in the right's argument are de-
tailed in Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 741, 774-85 (1986).
103. See R. Epstein, Takings, supra note 1, at 245-55 (workers' compensation); id.
at 295-303 (progressive taxation); id. at 309-24 (wealth transfer programs).
104. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1519
(1982); Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1589
(1982). Ellickson's article was a reaction to Frug's earlier paper, The City as a Legal
Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1980).
105. I have expressed some misgivings about appealing to a "republican tradition,"
arguing instead that we need to develop a new form of republicanism compatible with
the new epistemology. See Alexander, "Fragmented Survival": Republicanism as Rhet-
oric (unpublished manuscript delivered at The Eleventh Annual Conference of Critical
Legal Studies, Oct. 2, 1988) (on file at the Columbia Law Review).
106. See, e.g., Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93
Yale LJ. 1013, 1020-23 (1983); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Fore-
word: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 17-24 (1986); Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 31 (1985).
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vate (self) interest, is premised on the behavioral belief that govern-
mental actors are capable of acting in the interest of the common good,
rather than narrow self-interest.1 0 7
Public-choice theory, in contrast, argues that the production of
laws is a market process.' 0 8 Because governmental agents, like every-
one else, act exclusively in their own self-interest, they produce legisla-
tion in order to "maximize the aggregate political support they receive
from all interest groups."' 0 9 For public-choice theorists, then, the no-
tion of the common good is at best a utopian illusion, at worst a pretext
for self-serving deals.
The narratives and counter-narratives of power can be connected
with these opposed visions of government. For example, Stevens's First
English dissent and Brennan's Nollan dissent echo familiar republican
beliefs in the common good and the capacity of government to act in
the interest of the common good. Similarly, Rehnquist's and Scalia's
opinions in those cases reflect a profound sense of cynicism about the
motives of governmental actors, an outlook that many commentators
associate with public-choice theory." 0 Rehnquist and Scalia, like pub-
lic-choice theorists, view government land-use regulators as constantly
engaged in strategic behavior. By contrast, Stevens and Brennan hold
a more benign view of regulators. They are more inclined to accept the
legitimacy of public values that government planners allege to be their
motives. Caricaturing the respective visions, republicans like Stevens
and Brennan view government regulators as saints, while public-choice
theorists like Rehnquist and Scalia regard them as villains."'
107. See, e.g., Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory, 6 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 317 (1977); Sunstein, supra note 106, at 81-85.
108. See, e.g., J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962); R.
McCormick & R. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy: An Inquiry into
the Interest-Group Theory of Government (1981); Peltzman, Toward a More General
Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & Econ. 211 (1976); see also Macey, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 223, 227-33 (1986) (discussing the effect of interest-group maneuvering
on legislation).
109. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Ex-
change (forthcoming 73 Cornell L. Rev. (1989)).
110. See, e.g., Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, 87 Pub. Interest 80
(1987); Mikva, Foreword: Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev.
167, 167-69 (1988).
111. Public-choice theorists argue that their theory does not imply a vision of regu-
lators as villains. They interpret political decisions in market terms, meaning that politi-
cians act strategically to advance private, not public intersts, but, they contend, this does
not equate governmental strategical behavior with coercion. Regulators are passive
agents, merely reflecting interest-group preferences to advance their own self-interest
(such as being reelected or reappointed). Public-choice theorists conclude that we
should expect regulators to forebear from regulating when regulation would disadvan-
tage a well-defined interest group. See Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 Va.
L. Rev. 339, 347-51 (1988).
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IV. NARRATIVES AND METHODOLOGY
Connecting the narratives and counter-narratives of power in land-
use regulation with these deeper political visions illuminates method-
ological arguments. Political vision has driven takings methodology.
Thus, it is no coincidence that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, who have attempted to infuse a new formalism in takings doc-
trine,112 are also among those who tell the narrative of regulatory
power. They tell that story in the belief that ad hoc balancing of the
kind the Court has been practicing openly in recent years 31 3 feeds the
villainous practices of land-use regulators.
One could, with some plausibility, turn public-choice theory on its
practitioners to gain insight into the emerging methodological empha-
sis on formalism in cases like First English and Nollan. The new formal-
ism really represents a new era of judicial activism in takings
jurisprudence, carried out in support of the interests of individual land-
owners, from whom members of the Court gain advantages, albeit indi-
rectly, such as landowners urging Congress to raise the Justices'
salaries or perhaps to support their nominations to higher offices.
While Rehnquist's and Scalia's opinions in First English and Nollan
unquestionably are activist in defense of private-property values, the
more obvious and plausible explanation for their activism is political
vision or ideology. Active judicial scrutiny of land-use regulation is vi-
tal to correcting the imbalance of power existing between regulators
and the regulated. Those who tell the story of power imbalance and
regulatory coercion develop regulatory takings doctrine instrumentally,
expanding its scope to give otherwise vulnerable private landowners
greater leverage against planning agencies. A broadly defined regula-
tory takings doctrine is a means of "level[ing] the playing field between
landowners and their regulators."'1 14 It is this vision of power imbal-
ance and the desire to empower owners against regulatory abuse that
explains the reliance on categories and property conceptualism.
Conversely, those who hold a more benign view of government
land-use regulators find less need for categories of per se takings and
fixed definitions of property. Those elements bespeak fear of govern-
mental abuse. The eclecticism of Penn Central's methodology rejects
such an attitude in favor of pragmatic commitment to the ideal of gov-
ernance in the interest of the common good. That more benign out-
112. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text. It is doubtful, however, that the
Court has shifted significantly toward formalism in its recent takings decisions. While
the Court in cases like Irving unquestionably makes conceptualistic noises and relies on
categorical reasoning in Kaiser Aetna and Loretto, in Keystone it leaves a great deal of its
Penn Central balancing apparatus intact.
113. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
114. Fischel, supra note 74, at 51.
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look on government underlies the power of eminent domain. 1 5 It is
benign, but pragmatically so. It recognizes that individually we are ca-
pable of acting without regard to others, and since government is a
collection of individuals, government is also capable of acting abu-
sively. Eclecticism of the kind practiced in Penn Central leaves open that
possibility. Unlike formalism, however, it also leaves open the possibil-
ity of government for the common good.
CONCLUSION
The implications of taking the interpretive turn for takings meth-
odology should be apparent by now. Since the interpretive perspective
understands questions of who is empowered and who is coerced in the
land-use planning context as open, it implies that courts should reject
formalist approaches to regulatory takings disputes. Formalizing doc-
trinal practices merely privileges one interpretation over another, fore-
closing edifying public conversation about power and its distribtition in
society. Maintaining public conversation requires that our doctrinal
practices in takings law remain fluid and exposed to doubt. Acknowl-
edging the narratives of power embedded in takings cases as narratives
is a first step toward such a form of doctrine.
115. Krier, supra note 1, at 25 ("Surely it is the image of a benign government that
lies behind.., all government powers, including the power to regulate.").
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